For decades, Europe’s technological relationship with the United States appeared remarkably stable.
American companies supplied the cloud platforms, enterprise software, semiconductors, operating systems and, more recently, the foundation models on which European companies increasingly depend. Europe contributed advanced industrial engineering, pharmaceutical research, precision manufacturing, scientific talent and access to sophisticated enterprise customers.
This relationship was not based solely on technical performance or price.
It was based on trust.
But that trust has weakened.
Recent American trade actions have shown how quickly long-established economic relationships can become instruments of political pressure. Switzerland was temporarily subjected to a 39% US tariff—the highest rate imposed on a European country—before negotiations brought it closer to the European Union’s rate. Even now, Swiss companies continue to seek a more stable and legally binding arrangement with Washington. (Reuters)
Europe’s trade with the United States remains enormous and economically indispensable. Transatlantic trade even reached record levels despite the recent tensions. (Reuters)
The conclusion should therefore not be that Europe must turn away from America.
The conclusion is that Europe can no longer afford to depend almost entirely on one foreign technology ecosystem.
Nowhere should this question matter more than in Europe’s industrial economies, particularly Germany and Switzerland.
Both countries have built their reputations on reliability, long-term business relationships, engineering excellence and trust. High-quality industrial products and critical services cannot be separated from dependable partnerships.
When the political foundation beneath those partnerships becomes unpredictable, companies must examine their alternatives.
And that leads to an uncomfortable but increasingly unavoidable question:
Can China become a serious strategic high-tech partner for Europe?
The answer is neither a naïve yes nor a reflexive no.
It is:
Potentially—but only selectively, under European control and with far stronger safeguards than Europe has traditionally demanded from its American partners.
China Is No Longer Simply the World’s Factory
Many Europeans still speak about China primarily as a manufacturing location.
That view is decades out of date.
China has become one of the world’s two most important high-tech ecosystems. It is globally competitive—or already leading—in electric vehicles, batteries, solar technology, drones, telecommunications, high-speed rail, robotics, industrial automation, digital payments and advanced manufacturing.
It is also becoming a serious AI power.
According to Stanford’s 2026 AI Index, the performance gap between the strongest American and Chinese AI models has effectively closed. American and Chinese models have exchanged the lead several times since early 2025, and the leading US model was only 2.7% ahead in March 2026. The United States still produces more top-tier models and attracts much more private AI investment, while China leads in areas including publication volume, citations, patent output and industrial robot deployment. (hai.stanford.edu)
China also operates at a scale that Europe increasingly struggles to match.
The International Federation of Robotics reported that 542,000 industrial robots were installed worldwide in 2024. Asia accounted for 74% of those installations, with China by far the largest individual market. (IFR International Federation of Robotics)
This matters because innovation is not only created in laboratories.
It is also created through deployment.
A robot, AI model or manufacturing process improves when it is tested thousands of times in real factories, warehouses, hospitals and logistics systems. China’s enormous domestic market and manufacturing base provide exactly these conditions.
The question is therefore no longer whether China possesses serious technology.
It clearly does.
The more difficult question is whether European companies can use that technology without creating unacceptable economic, political and security risks.
Europe Must Be Honest About Its Own Position
Europe remains highly innovative.
Switzerland continues to lead the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Global Innovation Index. Sweden ranks second, while Finland, the Netherlands and Denmark are also in the global top ten. Germany ranks eleventh and France thirteenth. China entered the top ten in 2025. (WIPO)
These rankings reflect real strengths.
Germany remains one of the world’s foremost industrial economies. It excels in machinery, automotive engineering, chemicals, production systems and industrial know-how.
Switzerland is world-class in pharmaceuticals, medical technology, precision engineering, specialised machinery and scientific research.
France has built a growing AI ecosystem.
The Nordic countries remain strong in digitalisation, telecoms and energy technology.
But Europe must stop confusing innovation capacity with strategic technological control.
Europe does not possess a hyperscale cloud ecosystem comparable to Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure or Google Cloud.
It has no globally dominant smartphone operating system.
It lacks a leading general-purpose semiconductor platform.
It has not created a foundation-model company with the international market position of the largest American providers.
And despite some excellent robotics companies, it does not possess anything comparable to China’s integrated robotics, component and manufacturing ecosystem.
Europe develops important technologies.
But it often fails to scale them, commercialise them rapidly or turn them into global platforms.
Germany is a striking example.
It has superb engineers and globally respected industrial companies, yet many of its businesses have struggled to compete with the development speed, software capabilities and supply-chain integration of American and Chinese competitors.
Switzerland faces a similar danger.
It may rank first in innovation, but much of that strength is concentrated in pharmaceuticals, research and specialised industries. A high ranking does not mean that the country controls the cloud, AI, semiconductor or robotics infrastructure on which its future economy will depend.
Europe therefore needs to distinguish between two different achievements:
Being innovative is not the same as being technologically sovereign.
Europe possesses the first.
It does not yet possess the second.
The Case Against Closer Chinese High-Tech Collaboration
The risks are substantial. They should not be minimised in the interest of appearing open-minded.
Intellectual-property risks are real
China has repeatedly faced allegations of acquiring foreign technology through forced transfers, cyber operations, insiders and industrial espionage.
Not every Chinese company behaves this way. Treating every Chinese executive or engineer as a security risk would be both unfair and strategically foolish.
But history cannot simply be ignored.
Companies working in semiconductors, aerospace, robotics, pharmaceuticals, advanced manufacturing or industrial AI must assume that highly valuable intellectual property will attract attention.
Core technology should therefore never be transferred merely because a joint project appears commercially attractive.
Cybersecurity concerns are unavoidable
European governments and companies regularly report espionage and cyber activity attributed to Chinese state-linked actors.
This does not prove that every Chinese cloud platform, AI model or piece of hardware contains a hidden risk.
It does mean that trust cannot be based on reputation, contracts or personal relationships alone.
Security must be built technically.
Sensitive systems require segmentation, independent monitoring, strict access control, code inspection, local data storage and the ability to operate without continued access by the original supplier.
China’s political and commercial systems are closely connected
European managers are accustomed to a clearer separation between companies, government and national strategy.
That boundary can be less transparent in China.
A private company may still operate under regulatory, political or national-security obligations that are difficult for foreign partners to assess.
This becomes especially important when collaboration involves telecommunications, critical infrastructure, cloud systems, geospatial data, industrial control systems or dual-use technologies.
Legal enforcement may be difficult
A contract is only valuable when it can be enforced.
European companies must ask:
Which law governs the relationship?
Where will disputes be heard?
Can judgments be enforced against the partner?
Who owns jointly developed intellectual property?
Can a European company inspect how its technology is being used?
What happens when commercial obligations conflict with state instructions?
These issues must be resolved before technology is transferred, not after a dispute begins.
Cultural and language barriers remain significant
Chinese and European business cultures differ in hierarchy, negotiation, communication and relationship-building.
German and Swiss managers often expect precise documentation, direct answers and clearly defined responsibilities.
Chinese partnerships may rely more heavily on context, senior relationships, gradual trust-building and evolving commitments.
Neither model is inherently superior.
But unrecognised differences frequently create delays, frustration and mistrust.
English may be sufficient at board level. It is not always sufficient when engineers, lawyers, cybersecurity teams and production managers must resolve highly detailed problems.
Europe could merely exchange one dependency for another
Replacing dependence on American technology with dependence on Chinese technology would not create sovereignty.
It would simply move Europe’s vulnerability from Washington to Beijing.
The objective must therefore be diversification.
China should become an additional option—not a new exclusive supplier.
Export controls could disrupt projects
A European-Chinese project may still depend on American semiconductors, chip-design tools, cloud software or intellectual property.
US export restrictions could therefore interrupt cooperation even when the European and Chinese partners wish to continue.
European export-control and dual-use rules may create additional constraints.
Every serious project needs to map these dependencies before major investments are made.
Chinese openness is not guaranteed
Chinese open-weight AI models currently provide an attractive alternative to closed American systems. But Beijing is reportedly considering tighter controls over some advanced models as concerns grow about foreign access to strategically important technology. (The Wall Street Journal)
Europe should therefore not assume that Chinese technology will remain freely available forever.
Dependence on an open Chinese model can still become strategic dependence if future versions, support, training data or key components are restricted.
Geopolitical escalation could make cooperation impossible
A conflict involving Taiwan, additional sanctions, a technology blockade or a broader confrontation between China and the United States could disrupt projects with little warning.
Any collaboration must therefore include a credible exit strategy.
The Case for Collaboration
The risks are serious.
But there are equally serious reasons why Europe should explore cooperation instead of dismissing it.
Europe needs a counterweight to US technology power
The United States will remain one of Europe’s most important economic, security and technology partners.
But a strong relationship does not justify total dependency.
Europe increasingly relies on American companies for:
cloud infrastructure;
productivity software;
enterprise platforms;
foundation models;
semiconductors;
cybersecurity tools;
digital advertising;
mobile operating systems.
This concentration creates commercial and political leverage.
Even where Chinese technology is not selected, the presence of a credible alternative can improve European negotiating power.
A counterweight does not need to replace the dominant supplier to be strategically valuable.
Chinese AI has become a credible alternative
The strongest Chinese models are no longer simply lower-cost copies of American systems.
They are increasingly competitive in reasoning, coding, multilingual applications and enterprise use. Stanford’s 2026 findings show that the frontier performance gap has become small and unstable rather than structural. (hai.stanford.edu)
This gives European companies an opportunity to evaluate several AI ecosystems rather than accepting that every serious model must come from California.
Open-weight models can offer greater control
Many Chinese AI developers have made model weights available for local deployment.
This can allow a European company to operate a model inside its own infrastructure or with a trusted local hosting provider.
That is strategically different from relying entirely on a foreign cloud API.
Local operation can make it possible to:
keep sensitive data in Europe;
inspect and test the model;
fine-tune it for a specific industry;
control access;
reduce exposure to sudden API changes;
continue operating if the external provider becomes unavailable.
Open weights do not automatically guarantee security or true openness. Licences, training sources, software dependencies and vulnerabilities still need examination.
But the architecture can provide more control than a completely closed service.
China understands industrialisation and scale
This may be the most important opportunity for Germany and Switzerland.
Europe is often strong at invention.
China is often stronger at turning inventions into affordable, scalable products.
Germany and Switzerland possess world-class knowledge in machinery, precision systems, medical technology, industrial automation, sensors and production quality.
China brings:
deep component supply chains;
rapid prototyping;
manufacturing capacity;
cost optimisation;
deployment speed;
access to enormous production environments.
These capabilities are highly complementary.
The danger is that Europe transfers the essential intellectual property while retaining only a shrinking part of the value chain.
The opportunity is to divide responsibilities intelligently: protect the core technology in Europe while using Chinese manufacturing and deployment capabilities where they create real advantage.
Europe needs access to real-world AI and robotics deployment
Physical AI and robotics cannot be developed through software research alone.
Systems must operate in unpredictable physical environments.
They need factory data, logistics data, safety incidents, human interaction and thousands of operational cycles.
China provides deployment environments at a scale that is difficult to reproduce in Europe.
A German robotics company or Swiss industrial-AI company could learn faster by working in Chinese factories—provided that its software, data and core intellectual property remain protected.
Europe can supply the trust layer
Chinese companies are frequently strong in functionality, speed and price.
But European customers may still question transparency, data protection, safety, governance and accountability.
These are areas in which Europe can contribute substantial value.
European companies can provide:
trusted applications;
regulated-industry integration;
independent validation;
safety certification;
privacy-preserving architectures;
auditability;
quality assurance;
enforceable customer relationships.
This is not a one-sided relationship in which Europe receives technology from China.
Europe can provide something that many Chinese technology companies need: credibility and trust in regulated international markets.
Collaboration could accelerate European industrial renewal
Europe’s industrial base is under pressure.
German automotive companies face formidable Chinese competitors.
European robotics and automation companies are confronting faster innovation cycles.
Energy costs, fragmented markets, complex regulation and cautious investment cultures make scaling harder.
Chinese partnerships could provide access to technology, components and deployment environments that shorten development cycles.
The purpose should not be to outsource European innovation.
It should be to move more quickly from European invention to globally competitive products.
Competition among ecosystems creates resilience
Europe should be able to choose between American, Chinese, European, Indian and open-source technology.
No supplier should be indispensable.
A company that can move workloads between different models and cloud environments is in a stronger position than one locked into a single provider.
A manufacturer that has several qualified component suppliers is more resilient than one dependent on one country.
Optionality is not inefficiency.
It is strategic insurance.
Europe Does Not Need to Choose Between America and China
The debate is often framed incorrectly.
Europe is told that it must remain firmly inside the American technology ecosystem—or risk moving into China’s sphere of influence.
That is a false choice.
Europe should cooperate with the United States where the relationship is mutually beneficial.
It should build more of its own strategic technology.
It should work with India in software, engineering and digital services.
And it should explore Chinese capabilities in AI, robotics, manufacturing, batteries, mobility and industrial technology.
The objective is not neutrality between political systems.
The objective is technological and commercial independence.
Europe should reject the idea that international collaboration requires exclusive alignment with one foreign technology power.
A New Technology Triangle
A particularly promising model could combine three complementary ecosystems.
India: Software and engineering capacity
India has an enormous pool of software engineers, IT service providers and digital talent.
It can contribute application development, system integration, data engineering and scalable software operations.
China: AI, robotics and manufacturing
China can contribute competitive foundation models, robotics platforms, hardware production, component ecosystems, supply-chain depth and rapid industrialisation.
Germany and Switzerland: Industry, quality and trust
Germany and Switzerland can contribute industrial applications, precision engineering, regulated-market expertise, safety, governance, intellectual-property creation and trusted customer relationships.
Such a triangle would not exclude American technology.
American chips, cloud platforms, AI research and software would remain important.
But Europe would no longer depend on one ecosystem for every critical layer.
What Serious Collaboration Should Look Like
Europe should not begin with large political declarations or broad strategic agreements.
It should begin with narrowly defined commercial test beds.
A realistic European-Chinese technology partnership should include:
European hosting and operational control
Sensitive data should remain in European data centres.
European customers should control access rights, encryption keys, model deployment and operational monitoring.
European or neutral law
Contracts should be governed by German, Swiss or another mutually accepted European legal framework.
Disputes should be handled through recognised courts or international arbitration.
Clear ownership of intellectual property
Pre-existing intellectual property must remain with the original owner.
Jointly created technology must be precisely defined.
The agreement should specify where it can be used, sublicensed or commercialised.
Technical transparency
Software components, model dependencies, data flows and remote-access mechanisms should be independently inspectable.
No critical system should rely on undisclosed external connections.
A replaceable architecture
Applications should be designed so that the Chinese model, hardware component or cloud service can be replaced.
Vendor lock-in should be treated as a strategic risk from the beginning.
Limited initial scope
Early projects should use non-critical data and narrowly defined applications.
They should not begin with national infrastructure, defence systems, essential healthcare data or the company’s most valuable intellectual property.
Independent security testing
European cybersecurity specialists should test the complete system, including hardware, firmware, software libraries, model behaviour, data flows and update mechanisms.
Measurable performance requirements
The project should have clear objectives:
lower costs;
faster development;
better quality;
improved productivity;
new market access;
shorter manufacturing cycles.
A partnership that cannot demonstrate measurable value should not be expanded merely for geopolitical reasons.
A credible exit plan
The European partner must retain its data, documentation, interfaces and operational knowledge.
The system should continue functioning—or be replaceable—if the relationship ends.
Can China Replace the United States in Europe?
Not completely.
The United States retains deep and durable advantages:
the world’s strongest venture-capital ecosystem;
dominant cloud platforms;
leading semiconductor design;
globally established enterprise software;
outstanding research universities;
many of the leading frontier-model developers;
an unmatched ability to attract international talent.
China cannot simply reproduce the entire American technology ecosystem for Europe.
But this is the wrong test.
The question is not whether China can replace every American provider.
The question is whether Chinese technology can provide serious alternatives in selected strategic areas.
In electric vehicles, batteries, drones, solar equipment, industrial robotics, manufacturing and some open-weight AI models, the answer is clearly yes.
In advanced semiconductors, global enterprise software, frontier cloud infrastructure and several areas of fundamental AI research, the answer is more complicated.
Europe should therefore reject two equally simplistic positions:
China cannot replace the United States.
But also:
Europe cannot afford to ignore China.
The Real Strategic Choice
Europe’s future will not be secured by choosing one superpower over another.
It will be secured by ensuring that no superpower becomes indispensable.
The United States should remain a major partner.
China can become an important partner in selected areas.
India can play a larger role in software and engineering.
Europe must strengthen its own capabilities in industrial applications, trusted infrastructure, robotics, AI deployment and strategic technologies.
Germany and Switzerland have a particularly important role.
They possess exactly the combination Europe needs: industrial expertise, sophisticated customers, high-quality engineering and a reputation for reliability.
But these strengths must now be combined with greater speed, more openness to international technology and much stronger strategic control.
Can Chinese high-tech step into America’s footprint in Europe?
Not entirely.
Can it provide credible alternatives, strengthen Europe’s negotiating position and help Germany, Switzerland and other European economies accelerate industrial innovation?
Yes.
But only if cooperation is selective, transparent and structured around European control.
Trust should not be assumed because a company is American.
Nor should mistrust be automatic because a company is Chinese.
Trust must be engineered through governance, architecture, contracts and actual experience.
Europe should therefore stop debating the question only in abstract geopolitical terms.
It should test collaboration carefully.
Start small.
Protect the essential assets.
Measure the results.
And scale only when trust has been earned.
Europe’s objective should not be to move from American dependency to Chinese dependency. It should be to build a technology ecosystem strong enough to work with both—while remaining controlled by neither.